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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2012, том 5, страницы 356–385 (Mi cgtm171)  

Subgame Consistent Solution for a Cooperative Differential Game of Climate Change Control

David W. K. Yeunga, Leon A. Petrosyanb

a SRS Consortium for Advanced Study in Cooperative Dynamic Games, Hong Kong Shue Yan University, Braemar Hill, Hong Kong
b Center of Game Theory, Faculty of Applied Mathematics-Control Processes, St. Petersburg University, Petrodivorets, St. Petersburg, 198904, Russia

Аннотация: After several decades of rapid technological advancement and economic growth, alarming levels of pollutions and environmental degradation are emerging all over the world. Moreover, it is now apparent that human activities are perturbing the climate system at the global scale leading to disturbances to complex ecological processes. In this paper, we present a cooperative differential game of climate change control. Climate change is incorporated as structural changes in the pollution dynamics and the payoff functions. The policy instruments of the game include taxes, abatement efforts and production technologies choices. Under cooperation, nations will make use of these instruments to maximize their joint payoff and distribute the payoff according to an agreed upon optimality principle. To ensure that the cooperative solution is dynamically consistent, this optimality principle has to be maintained throughout the period of cooperation. An analytically tractable payment distribution mechanism leading to the realization of the agreed upon imputation is formulated. This analysis widens the application of cooperative differential game theory to environmental problems with climate change. This is also the first time differential games with random changes in the structure of their state dynamics.

Ключевые слова: Cooperative differential games, subgame consistency, climate change, environmental management.

Полный текст: PDF файл (302 kB)
Список литературы: PDF файл   HTML файл
Тип публикации: Статья
Язык публикации: английский

Образец цитирования: David W. K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan, “Subgame Consistent Solution for a Cooperative Differential Game of Climate Change Control”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 5 (2012), 356–385

Цитирование в формате AMSBIB
\RBibitem{YeuPet12}
\by David~W.~K.~Yeung, Leon~A.~Petrosyan
\paper Subgame Consistent Solution for a Cooperative Differential Game of Climate Change Control
\jour Contributions to Game Theory and Management
\yr 2012
\vol 5
\pages 356--385
\mathnet{http://mi.mathnet.ru/cgtm171}


Образцы ссылок на эту страницу:
  • http://mi.mathnet.ru/cgtm171
  • http://mi.mathnet.ru/rus/cgtm/v5/p356

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