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 Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2019, том 12, страницы 261–272 (Mi cgtm347)  Envy stable solutions for allocation problems with public resourses

Natalia I. Naumova

St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Mathematics and Mechanics, Universitetsky pr. 28, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia

Аннотация: We consider problems of "fair" distribution of several different public resourses. If $\tau$ is a partition of a finite set $N$, each resourse $c_j$ is distributed between points of $B_j\in \tau$. We suppose that either all resourses are goods or all resourses are bads. There are finite projects, each project use points from its subset of $N$ (its coalition). $\mathcal{A}$ is the set of such coalitions. The gain/loss function of a project at an allocation depends only on the restriction of the allocation on the coalition of the project. The following 4 solutions are considered: the lexicographically maxmin solution, the lexicographically minmax solution, a generalization of Wardrop solution. For fixed collection of gain/loss functions, we define envy stable allocations with respect to $\Gamma$, where the projects compare their gains/losses at fixed allocation if their coalitions are adjacent in $\Gamma$. We describe conditions on $\mathcal{A}$, $\tau$, and $\Gamma$ that ensure the existence of envy stable solutions, and conditions that ensure the enclusion of the first three solutions in envy stable solution.

Ключевые слова: lexicographically maxmin solution, Wardrop equilibrium, envy stable solution, equal sacrifice solution. Полный текст: PDF файл (288 kB)
Тип публикации: Статья
Язык публикации: английский

Образец цитирования: Natalia I. Naumova, “Envy stable solutions for allocation problems with public resourses”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 12 (2019), 261–272 Цитирование в формате AMSBIB
\RBibitem{Nau19} \by Natalia~I.~Naumova \paper Envy stable solutions for allocation problems with public resourses \jour Contributions to Game Theory and Management \yr 2019 \vol 12 \pages 261--272 \mathnet{http://mi.mathnet.ru/cgtm347} 

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• http://mi.mathnet.ru/cgtm347
• http://mi.mathnet.ru/rus/cgtm/v12/p261

 ОТПРАВИТЬ:      Citing articles on Google Scholar: Russian citations, English citations
Related articles on Google Scholar: Russian articles, English articles
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