Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2019, том 12, страницы 316–324
Two-stage network formation game with heterogeneous players and private information
Ping Sunab, Elena Parilinaab
a St. Petersburg State University, 7/9 Universitetskaya nab., Saint Petersburg, 199034, Russia
b School of Mathematics and Statistics and Institute of Applied Mathematics of Shandong, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, PR China
We consider a two-stage network formation game with heterogeneous players and private information. The player set consists of a leader and a finite number of other common players, which are divided into two types, passive and positive players. At the first stage, the leader suggests a connected communication network for all players to join. While it is assumed that the link information which every common player receives from the leader is private. Based on the private information, every player chooses the action, accept or reject, at the second stage. A network is formed finally. We show the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the game. The result is illustrated by an example.
heterogeneous players, private information, Myerson value, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
|Shandong Provincial Natural Science
was supported by the Shandong Province "Double-Hundred Talent Plan" (No. WST2017009).
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Язык публикации: английский
Ping Sun, Elena Parilina, “Two-stage network formation game with heterogeneous players and private information”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 12 (2019), 316–324
Цитирование в формате AMSBIB
\by Ping~Sun, Elena~Parilina
\paper Two-stage network formation game with heterogeneous players and private information
\jour Contributions to Game Theory and Management
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