Atomic routing game with capacity constraints
Darya A. Paltsevaab, Andrey P. Parfyonovba
a Institute for Problems of Regional Economics RAS
b Saint-Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes
A model of atomic routing game is considered. A network in this model has capacity constraints. Players in this game choose routes from some sources to one sink. A cost for each arc is determined by function which is increasing and convex. Algorithms finding Nash equilibrium and social optimum are constructed. These algorithms have polynomial-time complexity. This model can be used for transport networks with bounded traffic.
network games, routing games, network flows, Nash equilibrium, algorithm for searching equilibrium.
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Darya A. Paltseva, Andrey P. Parfyonov, “Atomic routing game with capacity constraints”, Mat. Teor. Igr Pril., 10:1 (2018), 65–82
Citation in format AMSBIB
\by Darya~A.~Paltseva, Andrey~P.~Parfyonov
\paper Atomic routing game with capacity constraints
\jour Mat. Teor. Igr Pril.
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