The analysis of equilibria in systems with endogenous formation of utility functions
Georgiy V. Kolesnik
The article studies the direct mechanism of influence on the utility functions of agents in social and economic systems. This mechanism is widely used in various forms by the authorities, commercial and non-profit organizations in order to form the desired behavior of individuals. The game-theoretic model is considered of the hierarchical system that includes agents and superindividuals who have the ability to modify their utility function. The properties of equilibria in this model are studied and the comparative analysis of the efficiency of systems of different structures is carried out. It is established that the centralized management of superindividuals in certain conditions may be less effective in terms of maximizing social welfare than decentralized schemes of participation in them. This property, in particular, can explain the successful development of peer-to-peer markets and mechanisms of decentralized financing of projects in various spheres of human activity. It is also established the presence of vertical competition effects in the system which lead to a decrease in the efficiency of the equilibrium as the number of superindividuals increases.
economic behavior, motivation, utility function, super-individual, meme, public interest, hierarchical system, Nash equilibrium.
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Georgiy V. Kolesnik, “The analysis of equilibria in systems with endogenous formation of utility functions”, Mat. Teor. Igr Pril., 10:3 (2018), 24–47
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\paper The analysis of equilibria in systems with endogenous formation of utility functions
\jour Mat. Teor. Igr Pril.
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