This article is cited in 1 scientific paper (total in 1 paper)
A model of tax competition under taxpayers' local competition
Georgiy V. Kolesnika, Natalia A. Leonovab
a JSC "IDGC Holding", Moscow
b JSC "R&D CenterProgramsystem", Tver
A model of tax competition of jurisdictions is studied which takes into account taxpayers' imperfect competition on each jurisdiction's market. It is shown that sharpening of taxpayers' competition alleviates the authorities' one and allows them to raise tax rates. This result diverges from the classical “race to the bottom” equilibrium.
taxation, tax competition, race to the bottom, multi-level competition, hierarchical system, extensive form game, subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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Georgiy V. Kolesnik, Natalia A. Leonova, “A model of tax competition under taxpayers' local competition”, Mat. Teor. Igr Pril., 3:1 (2011), 60–80
Citation in format AMSBIB
\by Georgiy~V.~Kolesnik, Natalia~A.~Leonova
\paper A model of tax competition under taxpayers' local competition
\jour Mat. Teor. Igr Pril.
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Kolesnik G.V., Leonova N.A., “Issledovanie ravnovesii nalogovoi konkurentsii v usloviyakh monopolisticheskoi konkurentsii nalogoplatelschikov”, Vestnik Tverskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: Prikladnaya matematika, 2011, no. 22, 111–126
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