This article is cited in 2 scientific papers (total in 2 papers)
Analysis of coherent quantum cryptography protocol vulnerability to an active beam-splitting attack
D. A. Kronbergab, E. O. Kiktenkocd, A. K. Fedorovefg, Yu. V. Kurochkine
a Lomonosov Moscow State University
b Steklov Mathematical Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
c Bauman Moscow State Technical University
d LLC 'DEFAN', Moscow, Skolkovo
e International Center for Quantum Optics and Quantum Technologies (the Russian Quantum Center), Moscow region, Skolkovo
f LLC "Acronis ", Moscow
g Laboratoire de Physique Theorique d'Orsay, Université Paris-Sud
We consider a new type of attack on a coherent quantum key distribution protocol [coherent one-way (COW) protocol]. The main idea of the attack consists in measuring individually the intercepted states and sending the rest of them unchanged. We have calculated the optimum values of the attack parameters for an arbitrary length of a communication channel and compared this novel attack with a standard beam-splitting attack.
quantum cryptography, quantum information theory.
|Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
|This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation in the framework of the Federal Target Programme "Research and development on priority directions of the scientific-technological complex of Russia for 2014-2020" (Agreement No. 14.579.21.0105, ID RFMEFI 57915X0105).
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Quantum Electronics, 2017, 47:2, 163–168
D. A. Kronberg, E. O. Kiktenko, A. K. Fedorov, Yu. V. Kurochkin, “Analysis of coherent quantum cryptography protocol vulnerability to an active beam-splitting attack”, Kvantovaya Elektronika, 47:2 (2017), 163–168 [Quantum Electron., 47:2 (2017), 163–168]
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This publication is cited in the following articles:
A. S. Avanesov, D. A. Kronberg, A. N. Pechen, “Active beam splitting attack applied to differential phase shift quantum key distribution protocol”, P-Adic Numbers Ultrametric Anal. Appl., 10:3 (2018), 222–232
Quantum Electron., 48:9 (2018), 843–848
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