Two-level cooperation in a class of non-zero-sum differential games
L. A. Petrosyana, D. W. K. Yeungb
a Saint Petersburg State University
b Hong Kong Shue Yan University
A two-level game is considered. At the first level, the set of players $N$ is partitioned into coalitions $S_i\subset N$, $i=1,\ldots,m$, such that $S_i\cap S_j=\varnothing$ for $i\neq j$ and each coalition plays against other coalitions a non-zero-sum cooperative differential game with prescribed duration and nontransferable payoffs. At the second level, within each coalition, the players are engaged in a cooperative differential game with prescribed duration and transferrable payoffs. The concept of solution is proposed for this type of two-level games. The properties of a solution, namely, its time consistency or dynamic stability, are studied.
coalition partition, cooperative differential game with transferable payoffs, Pareto optimality, payoff distribution procedure, time consistency.
|Russian Science Foundation
|This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (project no. 17-11-01079).
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MSC: 91A12, 91A23
L. A. Petrosyan, D. W. K. Yeung, “Two-level cooperation in a class of non-zero-sum differential games”, Trudy Inst. Mat. i Mekh. UrO RAN, 25, no. 1, 2019, 166–173
Citation in format AMSBIB
\by L.~A.~Petrosyan, D.~W.~K.~Yeung
\paper Two-level cooperation in a class of non-zero-sum differential games
\serial Trudy Inst. Mat. i Mekh. UrO RAN
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