A two-person game in mixed strategies as a model of training
A. S. Antipina, O. A. Popovab
a Dorodnicyn Computational Center, Russian Academy of Sciences, ul. Vavilova 40, Moscow, 119991, Russia
b Omsk State University
A bimatrix two-person game in mixed strategies is considered, and an extraproximal method for its solution is suggested. Both the game and the solution method are interpreted as a static and dynamic model of a learning process. A professor and a group of students act as players in this game. The convergence to a Nash equilibrium is proved; the convergence process is interpreted as a convergence of the learning process to an equilibrium learning strategy.
two-person game, Nash equilibrium, convergence, learning.
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Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics, 2005, 45:9, 1511–1519
A. S. Antipin, O. A. Popova, “A two-person game in mixed strategies as a model of training”, Zh. Vychisl. Mat. Mat. Fiz., 45:9 (2005), 1566–1574; Comput. Math. Math. Phys., 45:9 (2005), 1511–1519
Citation in format AMSBIB
\by A.~S.~Antipin, O.~A.~Popova
\paper A two-person game in mixed strategies as a model of training
\jour Zh. Vychisl. Mat. Mat. Fiz.
\jour Comput. Math. Math. Phys.
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