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International conference "Stochastic Optimization and Optimal Stopping"
September 28, 2012 10:00, Moscow, Steklov Mathematical Institute of RAS
 

Plenary talks


Equilibrium stochastic behaviors in repeated games

Arkady Kryazhimskiy

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg
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Arkady Kryazhimskiy
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Abstract: For repeated two-player bimatrix games we consider players' stochastic behavior strategies as transition probabilities on the sets of the players' pure strategies. Under reasonable assumptions we state the existence of stable Nash equilibrium behavior strategies within given constraints. Finally, we provide a few examples demonstrating that boundedly rational deterministic reference behaviors are non-equilibrim.

Language: English

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