

# EQUILIBRIUM MODELLING IN DEVELOPING ENERGY SYSTEMS

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Model CANOE — **C**apacity **A**nd **N**etwork **O**ptimization and **E**xpansion

## Model parameters:

- ▶ Set of Generating Companies (GCs):  $\mathcal{G}(g \in \mathcal{G})$
- ▶ Capacity types:  $\mathcal{I}(i \in \mathcal{I} = \{hydro, pumped, thermal, nuclear, \dots\})$
- ▶ Set of nodes:  $\mathcal{J}(j \in \mathcal{J})$
- ▶ Set of seasons:  $\mathcal{S}(s \in \mathcal{S} = \{winter, spring, summer, autumn\})$
- ▶ Set of seasons with peak loads:  $\mathcal{S}^\#(s \in \mathcal{S}^\#)$
- ▶ Set of hours:  $\mathcal{T}(t \in \mathcal{T} = \{1, 2, \dots, 24\})$
- ▶ Set of hours with peak load:  $\mathcal{T}^\#(t \in \mathcal{T}^\#)$
- ▶ Working and Holidays (weekends, days off) loads:  $d_{jst}^w, d_{jst}^h, j \in \mathcal{J}, s \in \mathcal{S}, t \in \mathcal{T}$
- ▶ Numbers of working and weekend days in seasons:  
 $\tau_s^w$  (e.g., 65),  $\tau_s^h$  (e.g., 25),  $s \in \mathcal{S}$
- ▶ Generating costs:  $c_{gji}, g \in \mathcal{G}, j \in \mathcal{J}, i \in \mathcal{I}$
- ▶ Unit investments:  $k_{gji}, g \in \mathcal{G}, j \in \mathcal{J}, i \in \mathcal{I}$
- ▶ Specific fixed costs:  $b_{gji}, g \in \mathcal{G}, j \in \mathcal{J}, i \in \mathcal{I}$

### Model parameters:

- ▶ Installed power capacity:  $z_{gji}^0, g \in \mathcal{G}, j \in \mathcal{J}, i \in \mathcal{I}$
- ▶ Max available power capacity:  $\bar{z}_{gji}, g \in \mathcal{G}, j \in \mathcal{J}, i \in \mathcal{I}$
- ▶ Installed lines capacity:  $v_{jj'}^0, j \in \mathcal{J}, j' \in \mathcal{J}$
- ▶ Max available lines capacity:  $\bar{v}_{jj'}, j \in \mathcal{J}, j' \in \mathcal{J}$
- ▶ Lines losses:  $\delta_{jj'}, j \in \mathcal{J}, j' \in \mathcal{J}$
- ▶ Daily capacity  $i$  usage (e.g, pumped storage power plant):  $\kappa_i, i \in \mathcal{I}$
- ▶ Seasonal capacity  $i$  usage (e.g., hydropower plant):  $\omega_i, i \in \mathcal{I}$
- ▶ Year capacity  $i$  usage (e.g., hydropower plant):  $\theta_i, i \in \mathcal{I}$
- ▶ Min capacity availability coefficients:  $\alpha_{gji}$
- ▶ Max capacity availability coefficients:  $\beta_{gji}$



### Model parameters:

- ▶ Working days generation:  $x_{gjst}^w$
- ▶ Weekend days generation:  $x_{gjst}^h$
- ▶ Power capacity:  $z_{gji}$
- ▶ Flow:  $y_{jj'}$
- ▶ Line capacity:  $v_{jj'}$

## Constraints:

- ▶ (*Generation<sub>g</sub>*) constraints:

$$\alpha_{gji} z_{gji} \leq x_{gjist}^w \leq \beta_{gji} z_{gji},$$

$$\alpha_{gji} z_{gji} \leq x_{gjist}^h \leq \beta_{gji} z_{gji},$$

- ▶ (*Capacity<sub>g</sub>*) constraints:

$$z_{gji}^0 \leq z_{gji} \leq \bar{z}_{gji},$$

$$g \in \mathcal{G}, j \in \mathcal{J}, i \in \mathcal{I},$$

## Constraints:

- ▶ ( $Day_g$ ) generation constraints (pumped storage power plant – pspp):

$$\sum_t x_{gj(pspp)st}^w \leq \kappa(pspp) z_{gj(pspp)}, \quad \sum_t x_{gj(pspp)st}^h \leq \kappa(pspp) z_{gj(pspp)}$$

- ▶ ( $Season_g$ ) generation constraints (hydropower plant – shp):

$$\sum_t (\tau_s^w \cdot x_{gj(shp)st}^w + \tau_s^h \cdot x_{gj(shp)st}^h) \leq \omega(shp) z_{gji}$$

- ▶ ( $Year_g$ ) generation constraints – yhp:

$$\sum_s \sum_t (\tau_s^w \cdot x_{gj(yhp)st}^w + \tau_s^h \cdot x_{gj(yhp)st}^h) \leq \theta(yhp) z_{gji}$$

### Constraints:


► (Reserve) constraints

$$\sum_g \sum_i z_{gji} + \sum_{j'} a_{jj'} (1 - \delta_{jj'}) \tilde{y}_{j'jst} - \sum_{j'} a_{jj'} \tilde{y}_{jj'st} \geq d_{jst}^w + r_{jst},$$
$$j \in J, s \in S^\sharp, t \in T^\sharp,$$

► (Balance) constraints

$$\sum_g \sum_i x_{gjist}^w + \sum_{j'} a_{jj'} (1 - \delta_{jj'}) y_{j'jst}^w - \sum_{j'} a_{jj'} y_{jj'st}^w = d_{jst}^w,$$
$$\sum_g \sum_i x_{jist}^h + \sum_{j'} a_{jj'} (1 - \delta_{jj'}) y_{j'jst}^h - \sum_{j'} a_{jj'} y_{jj'st}^h = d_{jst}^h,$$
$$j \in J, s \in S, t \in T,$$

# LOAD



— winter      — spring  
— summer      — autumn

load:  $d_{jst}^w$  - working days;

$d_{jst}^h$  - weekends;

generation:  $x_{jst}^w$  - working days;

$x_{jst}^h$  - weekends;

$s \in S$  - seasons;

$t \in T = \{1, \dots, 24\}$  - hours;

# THE MODEL

Costs=(generation)+(power)+(lines)

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_g \sum_j \sum_i \sum_s \sum_t \tau_s^w c_{gji} x_{gjist}^w + \sum_g \sum_j \sum_i \sum_s \sum_t \tau_s^h c_{gji} x_{gjist}^h + \\ & + f \sum_g \sum_j \sum_i \gamma_{gji} (z_{gji} - z_{gji}^0) + \sum_g \sum_j \sum_i \kappa_{gji} z_{gji} + \\ & + f \sum_j \sum_{j'} \rho_{jj'} (v_{jj'} - v_{jj'}^0) + \sum_j \sum_{j'} b_{jj'} v_{jj'} \rightarrow \min_{(x,z,v,y)}, \end{aligned}$$

s.t. (*Generation<sub>g</sub>*), (*Capacity<sub>g</sub>*), (*Day<sub>g</sub>*), (*Season<sub>g</sub>*), (*Year<sub>g</sub>*), (*Reserve*), (*Balance*).

# DUAL PROBLEM

$$\begin{aligned}
 & -f \sum_j \sum_i \gamma_{ji} z_{ji}^0 - f \sum_j \sum_{j'} \rho_{jj'} v_{ji}^0 + \sum_j \sum_{s^\#} \sum_{t^\#} \left( d_{js^\#t^\#}^w + r_{js^\#t^\#} \right) \nu_{js^\#t^\#} \\
 & + \sum_j \sum_s \sum_t d_{jst}^w \lambda_{jst}^w + \sum_j \sum_s \sum_t d_{jst}^h \lambda_{jst}^h + \\
 & + \sum_j \sum_i z_{ji}^0 \underline{\sigma}_{ji} - \sum_j \sum_i \bar{z}_{ji} \bar{\sigma}_{ji} + \sum_j \sum_{j'} v_{jj'}^0 \underline{\omega}_{ji} - \sum_j \sum_{j'} \bar{v}_{ji} \bar{\omega}_{ji} \rightarrow \max,
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & f \gamma_{ji} + \kappa_{ji} - \sum_{s \in S^\#} \sum_{t \in T_s^\#} \nu_{jst} + \sum_{s \in S} \alpha_{jis}^w \left( \sum_{t \in T} \mu_{jist}^w \right) - \sum_{s \in S} \beta_{jis}^w \left( \sum_{t \in T} \bar{\mu}_{jist}^w \right) + \\
 & + \sum_{s \in S} \alpha_{jis}^h \left( \sum_{t \in T} \mu_{jist}^h \right) - \sum_{s \in S} \beta_{jis}^h \left( \sum_{t \in T} \bar{\mu}_{jist}^h \right) - \underline{\sigma}_{ji} + \bar{\sigma}_{ji} = 0, \quad j \in J, i \in I \setminus \{\text{HP}, \text{PHPP}\}.
 \end{aligned}$$

# DUAL PROBLEM

$$\begin{aligned}
 & f\gamma_{j(\text{HP})} + \kappa_{j(\text{HP})} - \sum_{s \in S^\#} \sum_{t \in T_s^\#} \nu_{jst} + \\
 & + \sum_{s \in S} \alpha_{j(\text{HP})s}^w \left( \sum_{t \in T} \mu_{j(\text{HP})st}^w \right) - \sum_{s \in S} \beta_{j(\text{HP})s}^w \left( \sum_{t \in T} \bar{\mu}_{j(\text{HP})st}^w \right) + \\
 & + \sum_{s \in S} \alpha_{j(\text{HP})s}^h \left( \sum_{t \in T} \mu_{j(\text{HP})st}^h \right) - \sum_{s \in S} \beta_{j(\text{HP})s}^h \left( \sum_{t \in T} \bar{\mu}_{j(\text{HP})st}^h \right) + \\
 & + \bar{\sigma}_{j(\text{HP})} - \underline{\sigma}_{j(\text{HP})} - \sum_{s \in S} H_{j\text{HP}s}^S \xi_{js} = 0, \quad j \in J_{\text{HP}}^S.
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & f\gamma_{j(\text{HP})} + \kappa_{j(\text{HP})} - \sum_{s \in S^\#} \sum_{t \in T_s^\#} \nu_{jst} + \\
 & + \sum_{s \in S} \alpha_{j(\text{HP})s}^w \left( \sum_{t \in T} \mu_{j(\text{HP})st}^w \right) - \sum_{s \in S} \beta_{j(\text{HP})s}^w \left( \sum_{t \in T} \bar{\mu}_{j(\text{HP})st}^w \right) + \\
 & + \sum_{s \in S} \alpha_{j(\text{HP})s}^h \left( \sum_{t \in T} \mu_{j(\text{HP})st}^h \right) - \sum_{s \in S} \beta_{j(\text{HP})s}^h \left( \sum_{t \in T} \bar{\mu}_{j(\text{HP})st}^h \right) + \\
 & + \bar{\sigma}_{j(\text{HP})} - \underline{\sigma}_{j(\text{HP})} - H_{j\text{HP}}^Y \xi_j^Y = 0, \quad j \in J_{\text{HP}}^Y.
 \end{aligned}$$



# DUAL PROBLEM

$$\begin{aligned}
 & f\gamma_{j(\text{PHPP})} + \kappa_{j(\text{PHPP})} - \sum_{s \in S^\#} \sum_{t \in T_s^\#} \nu_{jst} + \\
 & + \sum_{s \in S} \alpha_{j(\text{PHPP})s}^w \left( \sum_{t \in T} \mu_{j(\text{PHPP})st}^w \right) - \sum_{s \in S} \beta_{j(\text{PHPP})s}^w \left( \sum_{t \in T} \bar{\mu}_{j(\text{PHPP})st}^w \right) + \\
 & + \sum_{s \in S} \alpha_{j(\text{PHPP})s}^h \left( \sum_{t \in T} \mu_{j(\text{PHPP})st}^h \right) - \sum_{s \in S} \beta_{j(\text{PHPP})s}^h \left( \sum_{t \in T} \bar{\mu}_{j(\text{PHPP})st}^h \right) + \\
 & + \bar{\sigma}_{j(\text{HP})} - \underline{\sigma}_{j(\text{PHPP})} - \sum_{s \in S} G_{js}^{\text{PHPP}} \left( \sum_{t \in T} \theta_{jst}^w \right) - \sum_{s \in S} G_{js}^{\text{PHPP}} \left( \sum_{t \in T} \theta_{jst}^h \right) - \\
 & - H_j^{\text{PHPP}} \left( \sum_{s \in S} \varphi_{js}^w \right) - H_j^{\text{PHPP}} \left( \sum_{s \in S} \varphi_{js}^h \right) = 0, \quad j \in J_{\text{PHPP}}^Y.
 \end{aligned}$$

# DUAL PROBLEM

$$\tau_s^w c_{ji} - \lambda_{jst}^w - \underline{\mu}_{jist}^w + \overline{\mu}_{jist}^w = 0, \quad j \in J, \quad i \in I \setminus \{\text{HP}, \text{PHPP}\}, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$$\tau_s^w c_{j(\text{HP})} - \lambda_{jst}^w - \underline{\mu}_{j(\text{HP})st}^w + \overline{\mu}_{j(\text{HP})st}^w + \tau_s^w \xi_{js} = 0, \quad j \in J_{\text{HP}}^S, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$$\tau_s^w c_{j(\text{HP})} - \lambda_{jst}^w - \underline{\mu}_{j(\text{HP})st}^w + \overline{\mu}_{j(\text{HP})st}^w + \tau_s^w \xi_j^Y = 0, \quad j \in J_{\text{HP}}^Y, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$$\tau_s^w c_{j(\text{PHPP})} - \lambda_{jst}^w - \underline{\mu}_{j(\text{PHPP})st}^w + \overline{\mu}_{j(\text{PHPP})st}^w + \psi_{js}^w + \varphi_{js}^w = 0, \quad j \in J, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$$\tau_s^h c_{ji} - \lambda_{jst}^h - \underline{\mu}_{jist}^h + \overline{\mu}_{jist}^h = 0, \quad j \in J, \quad i \in I \setminus \{\text{HP}, \text{PHPP}\}, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$$\tau_s^h c_{j(\text{HP})} - \lambda_{jst}^h - \underline{\mu}_{j(\text{HP})st}^h + \overline{\mu}_{j(\text{HP})st}^h + \tau_s^h \xi_{js} = 0, \quad j \in J_{\text{HP}}^S, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$$\tau_s^h c_{j(\text{HP})} - \lambda_{jst}^h - \underline{\mu}_{j(\text{HP})st}^h + \overline{\mu}_{j(\text{HP})st}^h + \tau_s^h \xi_j^Y = 0, \quad j \in J_{\text{HP}}^Y, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$$\tau_s^h c_{j(\text{PHPP})} - \lambda_{jst}^h - \underline{\mu}_{j(\text{PHPP})st}^h + \overline{\mu}_{j2st}^h + \psi_{js}^h + \varphi_{js}^h = 0, \quad j \in J, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{1}{2} f \rho_{jj'} + \frac{1}{2} b_{jj'} - \sum_{s \in S^\#} \sum_{t \in T_s^\#} \tilde{\eta}_{jj'st} - \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{t \in T} \eta_{jj'st}^w - \\ & - \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{t \in T} \eta_{jj'st}^h + \overline{\omega}_{jj'} - \underline{\omega}_{jj'} + \pi_{jj'} - \pi_{j'j} = 0, \quad j \in J, \quad j' \in J. \end{aligned}$$

# DUAL PROBLEM

$$a_{jj'} \left( \nu_{jst} - (1 - \delta_{jj'}) \nu_{j'st} \right) + \tilde{\eta}_{jj'st} \geq 0, \quad j \in J, \quad j' \in J, \quad s \in S^\sharp, \quad t \in T_s^\sharp.$$

$$a_{jj'} \left( \lambda_{jst}^w - (1 - \delta_{jj'}) \lambda_{j'st}^w \right) + \eta_{jj'st}^w \geq 0, \quad j \in J, \quad j' \in J, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$$a_{jj'} \left( \lambda_{jst}^h - (1 - \delta_{jj'}) \lambda_{j'st}^h \right) + \eta_{jj'st}^h \geq 0, \quad j \in J, \quad j' \in J, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$$\lambda_{jst}^w + \theta_{jst}^w - q_j \psi_{js}^w \geq 0, \quad j \in J, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$$\lambda_{jst}^h + \theta_{jst}^h - q_j \psi_{js}^h \geq 0, \quad j \in J, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$$\nu_{js^\sharp t^\sharp} \geq 0, \quad \underline{\mu}_{jst}^w \geq 0, \quad \bar{\mu}_{jst}^w \geq 0, \quad \underline{\mu}_{jst}^h \geq 0, \quad \bar{\mu}_{jst}^h \geq 0, \quad \underline{\sigma}_{ji} \geq 0, \quad \bar{\sigma}_{ji} \geq 0,$$

$$\tilde{\eta}_{jj'st} \geq 0, \quad \eta_{jj'st}^w \geq 0, \quad \eta_{jj'st}^h \geq 0, \quad \bar{\omega}_{jj'} \geq 0, \quad \underline{\omega}_{jj'} \geq 0, \quad \xi_{js} \geq 0, \quad \xi_j^Y \geq 0,$$


$$\theta_{jst}^w \geq 0, \quad \theta_{jst}^h \geq 0, \quad \psi_{js}^w \geq 0, \quad \psi_{js}^h \geq 0, \quad \varphi_{js}^w \geq 0, \quad \varphi_{js}^h \geq 0,$$

$$s^\sharp \in S^\sharp, \quad t^\sharp \in T_s^\sharp, \quad j \in J, \quad j' \in J, \quad i \in I, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

# POWER CAPACITY CLASSIFICATION

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{t \in T} \lambda_{jst}^w x_{jist}^w + \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{t \in T} \lambda_{jst}^h x_{jist}^h + \sum_{s \in S^\#} \sum_{t \in T_s^\#} \nu_{jst} z_{ji} = \\
 & = \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{t \in T} \tau_s^w c_{ji} x_{jist}^w + \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{t \in T} \tau_s^h c_{ji} x_{jist}^h + \\
 & \quad + f \gamma_{ji} (z_{ji} - z_{ji}^0) + \kappa_{ji} z_{ji} + \\
 & \quad + f \gamma_{ji} z_{ji}^0 + \bar{\sigma}_{ji} z_{ji} - \underline{\sigma}_{ji} z_{ji} + \\
 & \quad j \in J, i \in I.
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{PCI : } \underline{\bar{\sigma}_{ji}} > 0, \underline{\sigma}_{ji} = 0; \quad \text{PCII : } \bar{\sigma}_{ji} = 0, \underline{\sigma}_{ji} = 0; \quad \text{PCIII : } \bar{\sigma}_{ji} = 0, \underline{\sigma}_{ji} > 0;$$



# Dual estimates (prices) at nodes of the model, cent/kWh

| Country/<br>region |           | Winter |     |       | Spring |     |       | Summer |     |       | Autumn |     |       | Year  |
|--------------------|-----------|--------|-----|-------|--------|-----|-------|--------|-----|-------|--------|-----|-------|-------|
|                    |           | max    | min | aver. | max    | min | aver. | max    | min | aver. | max    | min | aver. | aver. |
| Russia             | Siberia   | 21.9   | 2.6 | 4.8   | 13.7   | 2.6 | 3.0   | 80.1   | 2.2 | 5.1   | 4.7    | 2.6 | 2.7   | 3.8   |
|                    | East      | 21.4   | 3.8 | 9.2   | 13.7   | 2.6 | 4.2   | 84.5   | 3.3 | 9.2   | 13.2   | 3.8 | 4.9   | 6.7   |
|                    | Sakhalin  | 21.6   | 3.6 | 12.5  | 13.4   | 2.5 | 6.6   | 21.9   | 3.4 | 8.1   | 13.7   | 3.6 | 8.7   | 9.1   |
| Mongolia           |           | 23.0   | 2.4 | 4.8   | 14.4   | 2.4 | 3.0   | 84.5   | 2.1 | 8.5   | 4.5    | 2.4 | 2.6   | 4.4   |
| China              | North     | 21.7   | 2.2 | 4.2   | 14.8   | 2.0 | 2.9   | 120.0  | 2.0 | 10.5  | 2.5    | 2.0 | 2.3   | 5.1   |
|                    | Northeast | 22.4   | 2.3 | 5.1   | 14.4   | 2.3 | 3.3   | 116.4  | 2.1 | 10.5  | 13.4   | 2.1 | 3.7   | 5.6   |
| DPRK               |           | 22.0   | 2.4 | 10.1  | 14.1   | 2.4 | 4.0   | 14.1   | 3.0 | 7.0   | 13.7   | 3.6 | 4.9   | 6.7   |
| RoK                |           | 21.8   | 2.4 | 10.4  | 14.0   | 2.4 | 5.2   | 14.0   | 3.0 | 8.3   | 13.8   | 3.7 | 7.9   | 7.9   |
| Japan              |           | 22.6   | 3.8 | 14.5  | 14.0   | 2.5 | 7.0   | 23.0   | 3.8 | 13.7  | 14.3   | 3.8 | 9.8   | 11.4  |

## POWER CAPACITY ORDERING

|     |             |                |                |
|-----|-------------|----------------|----------------|
| 1.  | Korea       | Thermal gas    | -16451947734.4 |
| 2.  | Japan       | Thermal1 oil   | -13085531842.1 |
| 3.  | Japan       | Thermal2 oil   | -5009759517.2  |
|     | ...         | ...            | ...            |
| 6.  | Siberia PES | Thermal coal   | -1210690958.4  |
|     | ...         | ...            | ...            |
|     | Siberia PES | HP1            | 9302267741.0   |
|     | ...         | ...            | ...            |
| 48. | Japan       | Nuclear        | 23623204195.4  |
| 49. | North China | Thermal2 coal  | 24806784000.0  |
| 50. | North China | Thermal 3 coal | 29410180388.6  |

## NODAL PRICES

$$\frac{\lambda_{jst}^w}{\tau_s^w} = c_{ji} - \frac{\mu_{jist}^w}{\tau_s^w} + \frac{\bar{\mu}_{jist}^w}{\tau_s^w}, \quad j \in J, \quad i \in I \setminus \{\text{HP}, \text{PHPP}\}, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$$\frac{\lambda_{jst}^w}{\tau_s^w} = \frac{\mu_{j(\text{HP})st}^w}{\tau_s^w} - \frac{\bar{\mu}_{j(\text{HP})st}^w}{\tau_s^w} + \xi_{js}, \quad j \in J_{\text{HP}}^S, \quad s \in S, \quad t \in T.$$

$\xi_{js}$  — dual variable  $\sim$  water rent.



## LINE COMPENSATION

$$\begin{aligned}j \rightarrow j' : \lambda_{jst}^w - (1 - \delta_{jj'}) \lambda_{j'st}^w + \eta_{jj'st}^w &= 0 \\(1 - \delta_{jj'}) \lambda_{j'st}^w &= \lambda_{jst}^w + \eta_{jj'st}^w\end{aligned}$$

Buyer compensates line and loses,  
 $\eta_{jj'st}^w$  — unit profit of line  $j \rightarrow j'$ .

## LINE CAPACITY EXPANSION

$$\begin{aligned} f\rho_{jj'}v_{jj'} + b_{jj'}v_{jj'} = & \sum_{s \in S^\#} \sum_{t \in T_s^\#} \tilde{\eta}_{jj'st} \tilde{y}_{jj'st} + \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{t \in T} \eta_{jj'st}^w y_{jj'st}^w + \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{t \in T} \eta_{jj'st}^h y_{jj'st}^h + \\ & + \sum_{s \in S^\#} \sum_{t \in T_s^\#} \tilde{\eta}_{j'jst} \tilde{y}_{j'jst} + \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{t \in T} \eta_{j'jst}^w y_{j'jst}^w + \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{t \in T} \eta_{j'jst}^h y_{j'jst}^h + \\ & + \bar{\omega}_{jj'}v_{jj'} - \underline{\omega}_{jj'}v_{jj'} + \bar{\omega}_{j'j}v_{j'j} - \underline{\omega}_{j'j}v_{j'j}. \end{aligned}$$

e.g.: new line Siberia PES — Mongolia,  
payment of Siberia PES — 3%  
payment of Mongolia — 97%

## Object

Power grid interconnections in Northeast Asia:

Russia, China, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Japan.

Countries exchange the power in the case of power shortage.

Target year 2030



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## Cooperative games (basic definitions)

$N = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  is the set of players  
 $K \subseteq N$  is a coalition  
 $N$  is the grand coalition

*Characteristic function*  $v: \{K \mid K \subseteq N\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is a function that assigns to every coalition  $K \subseteq N$  an attainable payoff  $v(K)$  such that  $v(\emptyset) = 0$ . Normally,  $v$  satisfies superadditivity condition

$$v(K) + v(T) \leq v(K \cup T) \quad \text{for every } K \subseteq N, T \subseteq N, K \cap T = \emptyset.$$

*Cooperative game* (in characteristic function form) is a pair  $(N, v)$ .

*Imputation* is a vector  $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$  satisfying the efficiency condition

$$\sum_{i \in N} x_i = v(N),$$

and the individual rationality condition

$$x_i \geq v(\{i\}) \quad \text{for every } i \in N.$$

## Cooperative games (basic definitions)

An imputation  $x$  is an element of *the Core* if

$$\sum_{i \in K} x_i \geq v(K) \quad \text{for every } K \subset N.$$

*The Shapley value* is an imputation  $x$  such that

$$x_i = \sum_{K: i \in K \subseteq N} \frac{(|K| - 1)!(n - |K|)!}{n!} (v(K) - v(K \setminus \{i\})), \quad i \in N.$$

## From ORIRES to Cooperative game

**Pessimistic (maximin) view:** a coalition  $K$ 's payoff  $v(K)$  is the maximal benefit guaranteed to  $K$  (the case of the worst behaviour of  $N \setminus K$ ).

Introducing new generation capacities is much more expensive than transmitting power from another country:

New generation capacity 800–8500 \$/kW vs. New line 180–950 \$/kW



The worst condition for any coalition is isolated work.

$v(K)$  is the minimal costs of  $K$  in the case of isolated work.

Number of coalitions:  $2^6 - 1 = 63$ , incl.  $N$ .

Various partitions  $(K, N \setminus K)$ : 32, incl.  $(N, \emptyset)$ .

To define characteristic function  $v$  one need to solve 32 LP problems with 42000 variables and 56000 constraints.



# The Core

is a nonempty set with infinite number of elements (in our case)

## Chebyshev center of the Core

|              | <i>Imputation (costs)</i> |        | <i>Isolated</i> | <i>Integration effect</i> |             |
|--------------|---------------------------|--------|-----------------|---------------------------|-------------|
|              | mill. doll.               | %      | mill. doll.     | %                         | mill. doll. |
| Russia       | 7353                      | 2.21   | 7591            | -3.14                     | -239        |
| Mongolia     | 670                       | 0.20   | 909             | -26.26                    | -239        |
| China        | 135301                    | 40.63  | 147757          | -8.43                     | -12455      |
| North Korea  | 0                         | 0      | 5047            | -100.00                   | -5047       |
| South Korea  | 54239                     | 16.29  | 57153           | -5.10                     | -2915       |
| Japan        | 135438                    | 40.67  | 138441          | -2.17                     | -3004       |
| <b>Total</b> | 333001                    | 100.00 | 356899          | -6.70                     | -23898      |

## Another element of the Core

|              | <i>Imputation (costs)</i> |        | <i>Isolated</i> | <i>Integration effect</i> |             |
|--------------|---------------------------|--------|-----------------|---------------------------|-------------|
|              | mill. doll.               | %      | mill. doll.     | %                         | mill. doll. |
| Russia       | 6853                      | 2.06   | 7591            | -9.72                     | -738        |
| Mongolia     | 837                       | 0.25   | 909             | -7.95                     | -72         |
| China        | 135801                    | 40.78  | 147757          | -8.09                     | -11956      |
| North Korea  | 4662                      | 1.40   | 5047            | -7.62                     | -385        |
| South Korea  | 52574                     | 15.79  | 57153           | -8.01                     | -4580       |
| Japan        | 132274                    | 39.72  | 138441          | -4.45                     | -6167       |
| <b>Total</b> | 333001                    | 100.00 | 356899          | -6.70                     | -23898      |

# Shapley value

always exists

Shapley value turns out to be an element of the Core.

Shapley value

|              | <i>Imputation (costs)</i> |               | <i>Isolated</i> | <i>Integration effect</i> |               |
|--------------|---------------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------------|---------------|
|              | mill. doll.               | %             | mill. doll.     | %                         | mill. doll.   |
| Russia       | 3867                      | 1.16          | 7591            | -49.07                    | -3725         |
| Mongolia     | 350                       | 0.11          | 909             | -61.46                    | -559          |
| China        | 141328                    | 42.44         | 147757          | -4.35                     | -6429         |
| North Korea  | 527                       | 0.16          | 5047            | -89.56                    | -4520         |
| South Korea  | 52578                     | 15.79         | 57153           | -8.01                     | -4575         |
| Japan        | 134351                    | 40.35         | 138441          | -2.95                     | -4090         |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>333001</b>             | <b>100.00</b> | <b>356899</b>   | <b>-6.70</b>              | <b>-23898</b> |

## Effects of cooperation

### Basic effects

|             | <i>Investments, bill. doll.</i> |       |              | <i>New gen. capacities, GW</i> |
|-------------|---------------------------------|-------|--------------|--------------------------------|
|             | Plants                          | Lines | <b>Total</b> |                                |
| Isolated    | 404.5                           | —     | <b>404.5</b> | 368.8                          |
| Cooperation | 290.7                           | 40.6  | <b>331.3</b> | 301.7                          |

### Power exchange between countries, TWh per year

|             | <i>Export</i> | <i>Import</i> | <i>Net export</i> |
|-------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Russia      | 54.6          | 37.2          | 17.4              |
| Mongolia    | 13.8          | 21.0          | −7.2              |
| China       | 162.7         | 21.0          | 141.7             |
| North Korea | 89.9          | 117.9         | −28.0             |
| South Korea | 87.2          | 87.3          | −0.1              |
| Japan       | 0             | 112.1         | −112.1            |

## Perfect market model (price $p$ — const.)

### Equations:

- GCs  $g \in \mathcal{G}$  profit:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pi_g = & p \cdot \sum_j \sum_i \sum_s \left( \tau_s^w \cdot \sum_t x_{gjst} + \tau_s^h \cdot \sum_t y_{gjst} \right) - \\ & - \sum_j \sum_i \sum_s \left( \tau_s^w \cdot \sum_t c_{gji} x_{gjst} + \tau_s^h \cdot \sum_t c_{gji} y_{gjst} \right) - \\ & - f \cdot \sum_j \sum_i k_{gji} (z_{gji} - z_{gji}^0) - \sum_j \sum_i b_{gji} z_{gji}\end{aligned}$$

Perfect market model (price  $p$  – const.)

$p$

$\Downarrow$

(Disconnected) System of  $LP_g$  ( $g \in \mathcal{G}$ ):

$\Pi_g \rightarrow \max,$

s.t.  $(Generation_g), (Capacity_g), (Day_g), (Season_g), (Year_g).$

$\Downarrow$

solution:  $x_{gjst}^*(p), y_{gjst}^*(p), z_{gji}^*(p)$

solution:  $x_{gjist}^*(p), y_{gjist}^*(p), z_{gji}^*(p)$




Year electricity supply:

$$E_{supply}(p) = \sum_g \sum_j \sum_i \sum_s \left( \tau_s^w \cdot \sum_t x_{gjist}^*(p) + \tau_s^h \cdot \sum_t y_{gjist}^*(p) \right)$$

Capacity supply:

$$C_{supply}(p) = \sum_g \sum_j \sum_i z_{gji}^*(p)$$

## Constructing the demand function: $E_D(p) = d - a \cdot p$



- ▶ Given demand  $D_{perfect}^0$
- ▶ Calculate  $p^0$  :  $E_{supply}(p^0) = D_{perfect}^0$
- ▶ Given elasticity  $\varepsilon^0 = \varepsilon(p^0) = \frac{E'(p^0)}{E(p^0)} p^0$
- ▶ Calculate coefficients:  $d = (1 + \varepsilon) D_{perfect}^0$ ,  $a = \varepsilon \frac{D_{perfect}^0}{p^0}$

## From perfect market to oligopoly

- ▶ *Price  $p$  is now variable*
- ▶ *Step I. Model Perfect is substituted by model Cournot*
- ▶ *Step II. Network-Load distribution model*



## Cournot model

System of connected linear programming problems:

$$\Pi_g \rightarrow \max,$$

s.t.  $(Generation_g), (Capacity_g), (Day_g), (Season_g), (Year_g),$

$$g \in \mathcal{G}$$

+ (connecting) equations:

$$E_T = d - a \cdot p,$$

$$E_T = \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} E_g.$$

## Cournot model is a potential game



from system of connected ! problems to one problem

$$-\frac{1}{2a}E^TQE + d \sum_g E_g - (\text{costs}) \rightarrow \max,$$


subject to  $(Generation_g), (Capacity_g), (Day_g), (Season_g), (Year_g), (Price_g), g \in \mathcal{G},$

$$E = (E_1, \dots, E_{|\mathcal{G}|}),$$

$$Q = \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 1 & \cdots & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & \cdots & 1 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & 1 & \cdots & 2 \end{pmatrix} \succ 0.$$


## Model Cournot does not consider

- Load curves



- Network constraints

## Scheme of central Russia



- 50 GCs (UGC1,...,UGK6,TGC1,...,TGC16, Rosatom, Rusgidro, InterRao,...)
  - 91 power plants
  - 7 capacity types: coal, gas ...
  - 4 seasons, 24 hours
  - Dimension  $\sim 200\ 000$
- 
- Models Cournot and Distribution in GAMS
  - Time  $\sim 5$  minutes.
- 
- Price  $p^{perfect}=0.068\$$
  - Price  $p^{cournot}=0.105\$$
  - Perfect electricity supply 422.6 TW
  - Oligopoly electricity supply 374.2 TW
  - Perfect capacity expansion 28.3 GW
  - Oligopoly capacity expansion 15 GW

In progress.

1. Inverse demand function for each node.
2. Network capacity constraints.

**Thank you for attention!**