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This article is cited in 1 scientific paper (total in 1 paper)
Control in Social Economic Systems
War of attrition with incomplete information and fuzzy players' types
A. S. Shvedov National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
Abstract:
The result on existence of a pure-strategy symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the war of attrition is generalized for fuzzy players' actions and types.
Keywords:
games with incomplete information, fuzzy sets, fuzzy random variables, Bayesian Nash equilibria.
Citation:
A. S. Shvedov, “War of attrition with incomplete information and fuzzy players' types”, Avtomat. i Telemekh., 2020, no. 7, 139–147; Autom. Remote Control, 81:7 (2020), 1279–1285
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/at15359 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/at/y2020/i7/p139
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