Equilibrium in safety strategies and equilibriums in objections and counterobjections in noncooperative games

The game problem of the sharing of a resource distributed in the section was first stated in the year 1957. The complexity of the model under consideration lies in the fact that for it, in most of the cases, the Nash equilibrium does not exist, but in practice there is an intuitively perceived stable rational behavior of players, which is based on the reflexive accounting of mutual objections. For the description of this behavior, the definition of equilibrium in safety strategies is suggested, which is equivalent to the Nash equilibrium for the cases in which the Nash equilibrium is available and exists for those situations in the stated problem in which the Nash equilibrium is unavailable. This permits investigating the model. The comparison is given of the suggested approach with the concepts used by various authors of equilibrium in objections and counterobjections for noncooperative games.