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Zhurnal Vychislitel'noi Matematiki i Matematicheskoi Fiziki, 1990, Volume 30, Number 7, Pages 984–996
(Mi zvmmf3228)
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This article is cited in 1 scientific paper (total in 1 paper)
The Pareto-optimality of Nash equilibrium in dynamic controlled systems with conflict
M. B. Mamedov Baku
Abstract:
Sufficient conditions are derived for the Pareto-optimality of an equilibrium. A class of positional differential games satisfying these conditions are considered. In other words, equilibria that are unimprovable in the equilibrium set are Pareto-optimal, i.e., unimprovable among all the situations of the game.
Received: 07.12.1988 Revised: 24.03.1989
Citation:
M. B. Mamedov, “The Pareto-optimality of Nash equilibrium in dynamic controlled systems with conflict”, Zh. Vychisl. Mat. Mat. Fiz., 30:7 (1990), 984–996; U.S.S.R. Comput. Math. Math. Phys., 30:4 (1990), 16–24
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/zvmmf3228 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/zvmmf/v30/i7/p984
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| Statistics & downloads: |
| Abstract page: | 564 | | Full-text PDF : | 723 | | References: | 92 | | First page: | 1 |
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