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Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya, 2011, Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages 60–80
(Mi mgta53)
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This article is cited in 1 scientific paper (total in 1 paper)
A model of tax competition under taxpayers' local competition
Georgiy V. Kolesnika, Natalia A. Leonovab a JSC "IDGC Holding", Moscow
b JSC "R&D CenterProgramsystem", Tver
Abstract:
A model of tax competition of jurisdictions is studied which takes into account taxpayers' imperfect competition on each jurisdiction's market. It is shown that sharpening of taxpayers' competition alleviates the authorities' one and allows them to raise tax rates. This result diverges from the classical “race to the bottom” equilibrium.
Keywords:
taxation, tax competition, race to the bottom, multi-level competition, hierarchical system, extensive form game, subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Citation:
Georgiy V. Kolesnik, Natalia A. Leonova, “A model of tax competition under taxpayers' local competition”, Mat. Teor. Igr Pril., 3:1 (2011), 60–80
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mgta53 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mgta/v3/i1/p60
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Statistics & downloads: |
Abstract page: | 465 | Full-text PDF : | 177 | References: | 63 | First page: | 1 |
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