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Preface Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
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6–7 |
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Analysis in social networks with usage of modified Raiffa solution for cooperative games Ondřej Černík, Radim Valenčík, Petr Wawrosz
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8–20 |
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Bidding games with several risky assets and random walks of stock market prices Victor Domansky, Victoria Kreps
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21–32 |
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Optimal doubling strategies in backgammon Sergei I. Dotsenko, Alexander V. Marynych
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33–46 |
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Models of concordance of public and private interests in control systems Olga I. Gorbaneva, Guennady A. Ougolnitsky
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47–57 |
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A differential game model for the extraction of non renewable resources with random initial times Ekaterina V. Gromova, José Daniel López-Barrientos
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58–63 |
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A differential game of pollution control with participation of developed and developing countries Ekaterina Gromova, Kristina Plekhanova
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64–83 |
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Two modes of vaccination program in controlled SIR model Elena Gubar, Ekaterina Zhitkova, Ekaterina Kupchinenko, Natalia Petriakova
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84–98 |
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Consistent conjectural variations equilibrium in an optimal portfolio model Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov, Nataliya I. Kalashnykova, Felipe J. Castillo-Pérez
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99–110 |
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Strategic stability of coalitions technological alliance parameters: a two-level cooperation Nikolay V. Kolabutin
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111–136 |
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Stochastic cooperative games application to the analysis of economic agent’s interaction Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy, Alexandra S. Malova
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137–148 |
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Quantum entanglement in a zero-sum game Dmitry Kravchenko
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149–163 |
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Evolutionary model of tax auditing Suriya Sh. Kumacheva, Elena A. Gubar
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164–175 |
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The vertical differentiation model in the insurance market: costs structure and equilibria analysis Denis V. Kuzyutin, Maria V. Nikitina, Nadezhda V. Smirnova, Ludmila N. Razgulyaeva
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176–186 |
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On Nash equilibria for stochastic games and determining the optimal strategies of the players Dmitrii Lozovanu, Stefan Pickl
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187–198 |
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Network game with production and knowledge externalities Vladimir D. Matveenko, Alexei V. Korolev
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199–222 |
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Cooperation in transportation game Anna V. Melnik
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223–230 |
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Generalized nucleolus, kernels, and bargainig sets for cooperative games with restricted cooperation Natalia Naumova
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231–242 |
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An axiomatization of the interval Shapley value and on some interval solution concepts Osman Palanci, S. Zeynep Alparslan Gök, Gerhard-Wilhelm Weber
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243–251 |
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Multistage game model with time-claiming alternatives Ovanes L. Petrosyan, Levon K. Babadzanjanz
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252–267 |
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On a large population partnership formation game with continuous time David M. Ramsey
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268–277 |
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Decomposition theorem and its applications Victor V. Rozen
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278–288 |
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A time-consistent solution formula for linear-quadratic discrete-time dynamic games with nontransferable payoffs Anna V. Tur
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289–299 |
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A fuzzy-core extension of Scarf theorem and related topics Valery A. Vasil'ev
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300–314 |
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Auctions of homogeneous goods: game-theoretic analysis Alexander Vasin, Polina Kartunova
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315–335 |
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Strategically supported cooperation in differential games with coalition structures Lei Wang, Li Song, Leon Petrosyan, Artem Sedakov, Hongwei Gao
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336–346 |
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On subgame consistent solution for NTU cooperative stochastic dynamic games David W.K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan
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347–360 |
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In memory of John Forbes Nash Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
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361–362 |
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In memory of Victor Domansky Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
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363–365 |