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Preface Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
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5–6 |
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Cost optimization for the transport network of Yakutia Galina I. Bybyakina, Taisia M. Plekhanova, Ekaterina V. Gromova
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7–16 |
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A signaling advertising model between an intelligent consumer and two e-tailers M. Esmaeili, M. Masoumirad
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17–26 |
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Information pooling game in multi-portfolio optimization Jing Fu
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27–41 |
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Cooperation in dynamic network games Hongwei Gao, Yaroslavna Pankratova
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42–67 |
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Games with incomplete information on the both sides and with public signal on the state of the game Misha Gavrilovich, Victoria Kreps
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68–78 |
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Static game theoretic models of coordination of private and public interests in economic systems Olga. I. Gorbaneva, Guennady A. Ougolnitsky
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79–93 |
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On the conditions on the integral payoff function in the games with random duration Ekaterina V. Gromova, Anastasiya P. Malakhova, Anna V. Tur
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94–99 |
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Modelling of information spreading in the population of taxpayers: evolutionary approach Suriya Sh. Kumacheva, Elena A. Gubar, Ekaterina M. Zhitkova, Zlata Kurnosykh, Tatiana Skovorodina
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100–128 |
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A search game with incomplete information on detective capability of searcher Ryusuke Hohzaki
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129–142 |
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Application of game theory in the analysis of economic and political interaction at the international level Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy, Viktoria V. Holodkova
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143–161 |
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Game-theoretic approach for modeling of selfish and group routing Alexander Yu. Krylatov, Victor V. Zakharov
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162–174 |
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Stationary Nash equilibria for two-player average stochastic games with finite state and action spaces Dmitrii Lozovanu, Stefan Pickl
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175–184 |
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Integrative approach to supply chain collaboration in distribution networks: impact on firm performance Natalia Nikolchenko, Anastasia Lebedeva
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185–225 |
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Blotto games with costly winnings Irit Nowik, Tahl Nowik
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226–232 |
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Social welfare under oligopoly: does the strengthening of competition in production increase consumers’ well-being? Mathieu Parenti, Alexander P. Sidorov, Jacques-François Thisse
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233–244 |
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Cooperation in bioresource management problems Anna N. Rettieva
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245–286 |
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Types of equilibrium points in antagonistic games with ordered outcomes Victor V. Rozen
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287–298 |
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Design and simulation of coopetition as lead generating mechanism Maxim Shlegel, Nikolay Zenkevich
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299–325 |
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On a dynamic traveling salesman problem Svetlana Tarashnina, Yaroslavna Pankratova, Aleksandra Purtyan
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326–338 |
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Constructive and blocking powers in some applications Svetlana Tarashnina, Nadezhda Smirnova
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339–349 |
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Coordination in multilevel supply chain Ekaterina N. Zenkevich, Yulia E. Lonyagina, Maria V. Fattakhova
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350–374 |
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Strategic alliances stability factors Nikolay Zenkevich, Anastasiia Reusova
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375–395 |
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10 years Game Theory and Management (GTM) Maria Bulgakova
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396–403 |