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Preface
Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
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6–7 |
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Graph Searching Games with a Radius of Capture
Tatiana V. Abramovskaya, Nikolai N. Petrov
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8–18 |
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Non-Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals
G. Attanasi, A. García-Gallego, N. Georgantzís, A. Montesano
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19–32 |
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The $\Pi$-strategy: Analogies and Applications
A. A. Azamov, B. T. Samatov
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33–46 |
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About Some Non-Stationary Problems of Group Pursuit with the Simple Matrix
Alexander Bannikov, Nikolay Petrov
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47–62 |
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Mathematical Model of Diffusion in Social Networks
Olga Bogdanova, Elena Parilina
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63–70 |
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Product Diversity in a Vertical Distribution Channel under Monopolistic Competition
Igor Bykadorov, Sergey Kokovin, Evgeny Zhelobodko
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71–104 |
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Strong Strategic Support of Cooperative Solutions in Differential Games
Sergey Chistyakov, Leon Petrosyan
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105–111 |
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Strategic Bargaining and Full Efficiency
Xianhua Dai, Hong Li, Xing Tong
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112–116 |
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Socially Acceptable Values for Cooperative TU Games
Theo Driessen, Tadeusz Radzik
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117–131 |
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Auctioning Big Facilities under Financial Constraints
María Ángeles de Frutos, María Paz Espinosa
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132–153 |
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Numerical Study of a Linear Differential Game with Two Pursuers and One Evader
Sergey S. Ganebny, Sergey S. Kumkov, Stéphane Le Ménec, Valerii S. Patsko
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154–171 |
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The Dynamic Procedure of Information Flow Network
Hongwei Gao, Zuoyi Liu, Yeming Dai
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172–187 |
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Game Theory Approach for Supply Chains Optimization
Mansur G. Gasratov, Victor V. Zakharov
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188–198 |
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Stochastic Coalitional Games with Constant Matrix of Transition Probabilties
Xeniya Grigorieva
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199–212 |
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Cash Flow Optimization in ATM Network Model
Elena Gubar, Maria Zubareva, Julia Merzljakova
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213–222 |
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Stable Families of Coalitions for Network Resource Allocation Problems
Vladimir Gurvich, Sergei Schreider
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223–230 |
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Signaling Managerial Objectives to Elicit Volunteer Effort
Gert Huybrechts, Jurgen Willems, Marc Jegers, Jemima Bidee, Tim Vantilborgh, Roland Pepermans
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231–240 |
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Two Solution Concepts for TU Games with Cycle-Free Directed Cooperation Structures
Anna Khmelnitskaya, Dolf Talman
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241–265 |
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Tax Auditing Models with the Application of Theory of Search
Suriya Sh. Kumacheva
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266–273 |
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Bargaining Powers, a Surface of Weights, and Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution
Vladimir D. Matveenko
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274–293 |
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On Games with Constant Nash Sum
Pierre von Mouche
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294–310 |
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Claim Problems with Coalition Demands
Natalia I. Naumova
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311–326 |
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Games with Differently Directed Interests and Their Application to the Environmental Management
Guennady A. Ougolnitsky
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327–338 |
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Memento Ludi: Information Retrieval from a Game-Theoretic Perspective
Georgy Parfionov, Romàn Zapatrin
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339–346 |
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The Fixed Point Method Versus the KKM Method
Sehie Park
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347–360 |
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Proportionality in NTU Games: on a Proportional Excess Invariant Solution
Sergei L. Pechersky
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361–367 |
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On a Multistage Link Formation Game
Leon Petrosyan, Artem Sedakov
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368–377 |
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Best Response Digraphs for Two Location Games on Graphs
Erich Prisner
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378–388 |
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Uncertainty Aversion and Equilibrium in Extensive Games
Jörn Rothe
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389–406 |
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Nash Equilibrium in Games with Ordered Outcomes
Victor V. Rozen
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407–420 |
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Cooperative Optimality Concepts for Games with Preference Relations
Tatiana F. Savina
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421–432 |
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A Fuzzy Cooperative Game Model for Configuration Management of Open Supply Networks
Leonid B. Sheremetov, Alexander V. Smirnov
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433–446 |
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Modeling of Environmental Projects under Condition of a Random Time Horizon
Ekaterina Shevkoplyas, Sergey Kostyunin
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447–459 |
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A Data Transmission Game in OFDM Wireless Networks Taking into Account Power Unit Cost
Anton Toritsyn, Rimma Salakhieva, Andrey Garnaev
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460–472 |
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Strict Proportional Power and Fair Voting Rules in Committees
František Turnovec
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473–488 |
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Subgame Consistent Solution for Random-Horizon Cooperative Dynamic Games
David W. K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan
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489–501 |
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Efficient CS-Values Based on Consensus and Shapley Values
Alexandra B. Zinchenko, Polina P. Provotorova, George V. Mironenko
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502–513 |
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