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Preface
Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
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6–7 |
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The Lexmax Rule for Bankruptcy Problems
Javier Arin, Juan M. Benito-Ostolaza
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8–23 |
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Network Game of Pollution Cost Reduction
Anna Belitskaia
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24–34 |
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A Model of Coopetitive Game and the Greek Crisis
David Carfi, Daniele Schilirò
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35–62 |
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Dynamic Models of Corruption in Hierarchical Control Systems
Andrey A. Chernushkin, Guennady A. Ougolnitsky, Anatoly B. Usov
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63–74 |
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When it Pays to Think about the Competition, and When it Doesn’t: Exploring Overconfidence Bias in Dynamic Games
Jennifer Cutler, Richard Staelin
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75–88 |
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A Survey on Discrete Bidding Games with Asymmetric Information
Victor Domansky, Victoria Kreps, Marina Sandomirskaia
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89–114 |
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Playability Properties in Games of Deterrence and Evolution in the Replicator Dynamics
David Ellison, Michel Rudnianski
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115–133 |
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Consistency to the Values for Games in Generalized Characteristic Function Form
Yuan Feng, Theo S. H. Driessen, Georg Still
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134–145 |
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Analysing the Folk Theorem for Linked Repeated Games
Henk Folmer, Pierre von Mouche
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146–164 |
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Service Quality’s Effects on the Selection of a Partner Airline in the Formation of Airline Alliances
J. Fu, S. Muto
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165–177 |
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Coalitional Model of Decision-Making over the Set of Projects with Different Preferences of Players
Xeniya Grigorieva
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178–188 |
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Decision Making Procedure in Optimal Control Problem for the SIR Model
Elena Gubar, Ekaterina Zhitkova
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189–199 |
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A New Characterization of the Pre-Kernel for TU Games Through its Indirect Function and its Application to Determine the Nucleolus for Three Subclasses of TU Games
Dongshuang Hou, Theo Driessen, Antoni Meseguer-Artola, Bolgárka Mosoni
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200–210 |
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Game-Theoretic Models of Collaboration among Economic Agents
Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy, Alexandra S. Malova
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211–221 |
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Differential Games with Random Terminal Instants
Sergey Kostyunin
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222–230 |
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Coalitional Solution in a Game Theoretic Model of Territorial Environmental Production
Nadezhda V. Kozlovskaia
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231–247 |
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On a Mutual Tracking Block for the Real Object and its Virtual Model-Leader
Andrew N. Krasovskii
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248–252 |
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Game-Theoretic Model on a Cognitive Map and its Tolerance to Errors in Input Data to Analyze a Conflict of Interests Between Russia and Norway in Barents Sea
Sergei G. Kulivets
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253–263 |
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The Strategy of Tax Control in Conditions of Possible Mistakes and Corruption of Inspectors
Suriya Sh. Kumacheva
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264–273 |
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Asymmetric Equilibria in Stahl Search Model
Sergey Kuniavsky
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274–288 |
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Differential Bargaining Games as Microfoundations for Production Function
Vladimir Matveenko
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289–300 |
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Pricing and Transportation Costs in Queueing System
Anna V. Mazalova
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301–306 |
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Optimal Strategies in the Game with Arbitrator
Alexander E. Mentcher
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307–315 |
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Solidary Solutions to Games with Restricted Cooperation
Natalia Naumova
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316–337 |
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On an Algorithm for Nash Equilibria Determination in the Informational Extended Bimatrix Games
Ludmila Novac
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338–350 |
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Forest Situations and Cost Monotonic Solutions
O. Palancı, S. Z. Alparslan Gök, G.-W. Weber
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351–361 |
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Two Approaches for Solving a Group Pursuit Game
Yaroslavna B. Pankratova, Svetlana I. Tarashnina
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362–376 |
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Entering of Newcomer in the Perturbed Voting Game
Ovanes L. Petrosian
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377–387 |
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Strategic Support of Cooperative Solutions in 2-Person Differential Games with Dependent Motions
Leon Petrosyan, Sergey Chistyakov
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388–394 |
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A Construction of Preference Relation for Models of Decision Making with Quality Criteria
Victor V. Rozen
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395–406 |
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Existence of Stable Coalition Structures in Three-person Games
Artem Sedakov, Elena Parilina, Yury Volobuev, Daria Klimuk
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407–422 |
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The Algorithm of Finding Equilibrium in the Class of Fully-mixed Strategies in the Logistics Market with Big Losses
Anna A. Sergeeva, Vladimir M. Bure
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423–433 |
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Polar Representation of Shapley Value: Nonatomic Polynomial Games
Valeri A. Vasil'ev
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434–446 |
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A Simple Way to Obtain the Sufficient Nonemptiness Conditions for Core of TU Game
Alexandra B. Zinchenko
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447–457 |
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