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Preface
Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
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6–7 |
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Dynamic SPICE-model of resource allocation in marketing networks
Movlatkhan T. Agieva, Olga I. Gorbaneva
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8–23 |
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Game theoretic models of sustainable management in marketing networks
Movlatkhan T. Agieva, Alexei V. Korolev, Guennady A. Ougolnitsky
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24–56 |
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Coordinating contracts as an instrument of supply chain profit maximization under short-term financing necessity
Irina Berezinets, Tatyana Voronova, Nikolay Zenkevich, Natalia Nikolchenko
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57–94 |
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Dynamic cooperative network games with pairwise interactions
Mariia A. Bulgakova
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95–120 |
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Games with fuzzy payment matrix
Vladimir G. Chernov
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121–131 |
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Models of optimal control in Tullock rent-seeking game
Denis N. Fedyanin
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132–141 |
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Coalition power estimation. Overview from the mathematical and philosophical perspectives
Ekaterina V. Gromova, Igor I. Evlampiev
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142–151 |
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Games and network structures on corruption, income inequality, and tax control
Elena Gubar, Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera, Suriya Kumacheva, Ekaterina Zhitkova, Galina Tomilina
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152–172 |
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Review on supply chain network metrics
Sajad Kazemi
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173–206 |
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Nash bargaining solution as negotiation concept for resource allocation problem: analysis of experimental data
Nikolay A. Korgin, Vsevolod O. Korepanov
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207–217 |
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Mechanism for shifting Nash equilibrium trajectories to cooperative Pareto solutions in dynamic bimatrix games
Nikolay A. Krasovskii, Alexander M. Tarasyev
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218–243 |
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Feedback based strategies for autonomous linear quadratic cooperative differential games with continuous updating
Ildus Kuchkarov
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244–251 |
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Supply chain finance solutions in joint working capital management
Yana I. Kuzmina, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
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252–295 |
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The dynamic Nash bargaining solution for 2-stage cost sharing game
Li Yin
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296–303 |
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On the existence of stationary Nash equilibria in average stochastic games with finite state and action spaces
Dmitrii Lozovanu, Stefan Pickl
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304–323 |
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Opinion control in a team with complete and incomplete communication
Vladimir V. Mazalov, Yulia A. Dorofeeva, Elena M. Parilina
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324–334 |
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Search strategies in the game with a team of pursuers and one evader on the plane
Semyon V. Mestnikov, Nikolay V. Petrov
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335–346 |
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Game-theoretic modeling of market participants' behavior: case of Russian Adjustable-Rate Bonds with Puts
Vitaly L. Okulov, Polina S. Zhilina
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347–359 |
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Looking forward approach with random horizon in cooperative differential games
Ovanes Petrosian, Sergei Pogozhev
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360–387 |
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Optimal pricing structure in a maintenance contract: a game theory approach
Henrique P. Z. Santos, Bruno N. Guedes, Claudio T. Cristino
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388–401 |
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On control reconstructions to management problems
Nina N. Subbotina
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402–414 |
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Feedback and open-loop Nash equilibria in a class of differential games with random duration
Anna V. Tur, Natalya G. Magnitskaya
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415–426 |
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Stochastic data transmission model with uncertainty on dropper's appearance
Xue Juan, Elena M. Parilina
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427–440 |
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Bibliography of Robert John (Yisrael) Aumann scientific papers
Victoria Kreps, Leon Petrosyan
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441–448 |
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Bibliography of V. V. Mazalov (В. В. Мазалов) scientific papers
Anna N. Rettieva, Leon A. Petrosyan
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449–466 |
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