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Preface
Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
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6–7 |
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Static and dynamic game theoretic models of opinion control in marketing networks
Movlatkhan T. Agieva, Alexey V. Korolev, Guennady A. Ougolnitsky
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8–19 |
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Economic capital allocation for corporate borrowers credit risk coverage
Irina V. Berezinets, Anastasiya S. Loginova
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20–37 |
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Non-zero sum network games with pairwise interactions
Mariia A. Bulgakova
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38–48 |
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On the value of the preexisting knowledge in an optimal control of pollution emissions
Angelina Chebotareva, Su Shimai, Sophia Tretyakova, Ekaterina Gromova
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49–58 |
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New characteristic function for two stage games with spanning tree
Min Cheng, Yin Li
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59–71 |
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Computing the price of anarchy in processor load balancing game with linear delays
Julia V. Chirkova
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72–81 |
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Multi-objective optimization approach to Malfatti's problem
Rentsen Enkhbat, Gompil Battur
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82–90 |
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Equilibrium in generalized Stackelberg game with arbitrary memory and planning horizon of players
Denis Fedyanin
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91–102 |
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Opinion control problem with average-oriented opinion dynamics and limited observation moments
Jingjing Gao, Elena Parilina
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103–112 |
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About construction of realizability arias of salesman strategies in dynamic salesmen problem
Anastasiya V. Gavrilova, Yaroslavna B. Pankratova
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113–121 |
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Cooperative $n$-person prisoner's dilemma on a network
Aleksandra L. Grinikh, Leon A. Petrosyan
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122–126 |
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A survey on two viruses extensions of epidemic model with continuous and impulse control
Elena Gubar, Vladislav Taynitskiy
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127–154 |
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The multi-objective model of working capital optimization
Anastasiia Ivakina, Mariia Smirnova, Nikolay Zenkevich
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155–182 |
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Optimal stopping in the balls-and-bins problem
Anna A. Ivashko
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183–191 |
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Cooperative game theory methods in the analysis of economic and political interaction at the international level
Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy, Victoria V. Holodkova
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192–215 |
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Nash bargaining solution as negotiation concept for resource allocation problem with Groves-Ledyard mechanism
Nikolay A. Korgin, Vsevolod O. Korepanov
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216–226 |
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Two-level cooperative game on hypergraph
David A. Kosian, Leon A. Petrosyan
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227–235 |
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Information collecting and dissemination in the network of taxpayers: Bayesian approach
Suriya Sh. Kumacheva, Galina A. Tomilina
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236–256 |
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Implementation of subgame-perfect cooperative agreement in an extensive-form game
Denis Kuzyutin, Yulia Skorodumova, Nadezhda Smirnova
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257–272 |
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Dynamic shapley value in the game with perishable goods
Yin Li, Ovanes Petrosian, Jinying Zou
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273–289 |
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On the existence and determining stationary Nash equilibria for switching controller stochastic games
Dmitrii Lozovanu, Stefan Pickl
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290–301 |
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Computation problems for envy stable solutions of allocation problems with public resources
Natalia I. Naumova
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302–311 |
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Implementation of a multi-objective working capital management strategy for financial supply chains
Mariia Smirnova, Anastasiia Ivakina, Nikolay Zenkevich
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312–328 |
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A categorical characterization of a ${\scriptsize1}\!\!\!\!\bigcirc$-iteratively defined state of common knowledge
Fernando Tohmé, Gianluca Caterina, Rocco Gangle
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329–341 |
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The International Conference on Game Theory and Management
Artem Sedakov
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342–358 |
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In memory of Victoria Kreps
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359–362 |
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