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Preface
L. A. Petrosyan, N. A. Zenkevich
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6–7 |
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Game theoretic approach to multi-agent transportation problems on network
Khaled Alkhaled, Leon Petrosyan
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8–17 |
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Modeling of the city's transport network using game-theoretic methods on the example of Petrozavodsk
Nikolay A. Ermolin, Vitalia A. Khitraya, Andrey V. Khitryi, Vladimir V. Mazalov, Natalia N. Nikitina
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18–31 |
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The $\tau$-value in multistage games with pairwise interactions
Mariia A. Bulgakova
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32–40 |
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Online-offline competition with heterogeneous consumers: an example for no existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium
Weixing Ford, Haipeng Han, Jie Zheng
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41–50 |
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Optimal control in a multiagent opinion dynamic system
Jingjing Gao, Elena Parilina
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51–59 |
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Cooperation in the multi-agent system with different types of interactions
Aleksandra L. Grinikh
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60–80 |
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Two-stage minimum cost spanning tree game under fuzzy optimistic coalition
Zhao Guo, Dan Wang, Min Chen, Yin Li
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81–95 |
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Difference Stackelberg game theoretic model of innovations management in universities
Vassily Yu. Kalachev, Guennady A. Ougolnitsky, Anatoly B. Usov
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96–108 |
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Dynamic games with incomplete knowledge in metric spaces
Igor Konnov
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109–120 |
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Equilibrium supply-demand allocation in a single-commodity network
Alexander Y. Krylatov, Anastasiya P. Raevskaya, Jiangrong Li
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121–131 |
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Non-autonomous linear quadratic non-cooperative differential games with continuous updating
Ildus Kuchkarov, Ovanes Petrosian, Yin Li
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132–154 |
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Tax authority and taxpayers: how does mutual collecting of information affect the effectiveness of tax control
Suriya Sh. Kumacheva, Galina A. Tomilina
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155–177 |
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Algorithm of hierarchical matrix clusterization and its applications
Elena A. Lezhnina, Elizaveta A. Kalinina
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178–188 |
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Importance of agents in networks: clique based game-theoretic approach
Juping Li, Anna Tur, Maksim Zavrajnov
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189–199 |
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Vector epidemic model of malaria with nonconstant-size population
Serigne Modou Ndiaye
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200–217 |
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Owen value for dynamic games on networks
Leon Petrosyan, Yaroslavna B. Pankratova
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218–225 |
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Existence of stable coalition structures in three-player games with graph-constrained solution
Ping Sun
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226–235 |
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Comparing the manipulability of approval voting and borda
Daria Teplova, Egor Ianovski
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236–249 |
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Concept of social value orientation in measuring cooperative behavior incentive in games
Yuyan Xia, Yin Li
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250–264 |
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Optimal control in the network model of bi-virus propagation
Liu Xiuxiu, Elena Gubar
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265–286 |
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Dynamic cost-sharing game with spanning arborescence
Peichen Ye, Yin Li, Ovanes Petrosyan
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287–302 |
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Solution of the meeting time choice problem for $n$ persons
Vladimir V. Yashin
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303–310 |
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On durable-strategies dynamic game theory
David W. K. Yeung, Yingxuan Zhang
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311–324 |
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Coordination in supply networks with combined topology
Nikolay A. Zenkevich, Natalia K. Nikolchenko, Irina V. Berezinets, Margarita V. Ivanova
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325–338 |
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Stable goal-based management strategy for supply chain finance
Nikolay Zenkevich, Anastasiia Ostashova, Anastasiia Ivakina
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339–364 |
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Dynamic structure in a four-strategy game: theory and experiment
Wang Zhijian, Zhou Shujie, Yao Qinmei, Wang Yijia, Pan Gang
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365–385 |
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